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ABSTRACT Employing a configurational approach we explore how ‘hybrid context’ shapes or-
ganizations’ adoption, and performance implications, of  management practice. We do because 
hybrid contexts have been a policy aim of  many governments seeking to blurr the distinction be-
tween the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. To conceptualize hybrid contexts we employ 
the dimensions of  market authority and (the multiple) political authority. Employing data from 
UK care homes, our findings suggest that: (i) the adoption, and performance effects, of  manage-
ment practices are conditioned by dimensions of  hybrid context; (ii) there is significant variation 
across the configurations in terms of  the mix of  management practices that lead to high and low 
performance; and (iii) there is a high degree of  symmetry between high and low performance, 
with good management practices being a necessary condition for high performing as compared 
to low performing organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we explore how an organization’s context influences its adoption of  ‘good’ 
management practices and their performance implications. Traditionally the private, 
public and not-for-profit sectors have been defined as distinct sectors, with characteristics 
that influence the adoption of  management practices (Allison, 1979; Rainey et al., 1976; 
Walmsley and Zald, 1973). Traditional sectoral differences, however, have been eroded 
over time as a result of  government reforms aimed at harnessing the best features of  pri-
vate and public organizations (Bozeman, 2013; Newman, 2001). While the intersection 
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of  governments and markets has become more pronounced, scholarship of  management 
and public policy have developed on parallel tracks (Bozeman, 2013) reflecting more 
traditional views of  sectoral differences.
Since the 1980s governments have sought to implement reforms associated with new 
public management (NPM) in order to encourage the public sector to become more 
business-like, encompassing quasi-markets, performance management and contract-
ing (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011; Hood, 1991; Lynn, 1998). Subsequently, govern-
ments have introduced post-NPM reforms to encourage forms of  governance that differ 
from both traditional bureaucratic-hierarchical forms and more commercially oriented 
forms encouraged by NPM (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011; Currie and Martin, 2016; 
McNulty and Ferlie, 2002). Finally, there has been an expansion in the provision of  
traditional public services by not-for-profit sector organizations, contracting with both 
government and private clients, leading to the rise of  the social enterprise (Skelcher and 
Smith, 2015).
To help understand the blurring of  sectors, and its impact on organizations, scholars 
have increasingly looked to the concept of  hybridity (Christiansen and Lægreid, 2011; 
Fossetol et al., 2015; Skelcher and Smith, 2015). Traditionally, hybridity has been viewed 
as an organizational level concept (Denis et al., 2015; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), spe-
cifically structural hybridity around forms of  governance (Denis et al., 2015; Miller et 
al., 2008). Hybridity, however, also relates to the context in which organizations operate 
(Skelcher and Smith, 2015). Recognizing the hybrid nature of  contexts, Herbert Simon 
(1998) warned of  the dangers of  studying markets to the exclusion of  government, and 
vice versa. In this paper we focus on hybridity of  context, which has been a policy tool 
through which governments have sought to address pressing social issues, remedying the 
underlying resource constraints of  public authorities by encouraging the introduction of  
private sector practices to improve organizational performance in the delivery of  public 
services (Brandsen and Karre, 2011; Brandsen et al., 2005; Skelcher, 2005; Smith, 2010). 
In doing so we address the call for studies of  contextual hybridity that move beyond 
narrow structural approaches that focus upon governance, to consider more broadly the 
interaction of  policy, through hybrid context, and organizational practices that influence 
performance (Bryson et al., 2014; Denis et al., 2015; Moore, 2013).
To examine the complex relationships that exist between the different dimensions of  
contextual hybridity, management practices and organizational performance, we employ 
a configurational approach (e.g., Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995; Doty et al., 1993; 
Ketchen et al., 1993; Ketchen et al., 1997; Meyer et al., 1993). The foundations for the 
configurational approach were presented by Ragin (1987), who emphasized the impor-
tance of  causal complexity, with causality often being conjunctural, equifinal and asym-
metric. Until recently, however, empirical studies employing a configurational approach 
have been hampered by the multivariate regression methods that involved additive, uni-
final, and symmetrical effects (Fiss, 2007; Grandori and Furnari, 2008). In response, Fiss 
(2007) was amongst the first to employ the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
set-theoretic approach to study organizational configurations and complex causality, 
demonstrating how it might overcome the mismatch between theory and methods that 
had plagued earlier configurational theorizing. We adopt a set-theoretic approach to 
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develop our understanding of  the relationship between contextual hybridity, manage-
ment practices and performance.
Through our study we make three contributions to the literature. First, we conceptu-
alize organizations’ hybrid contexts in terms of  the interplay of  market authority and 
political authority, as organizations are, to a greater or lesser degree, subject to both 
(Bozeman, 1987, 2013). We operationalize market authority through the degree of  com-
petition in a market, and political authority through the concept of  publicness (Bozeman, 
1984, 1987, 2013; Bozeman and Bretschneider, 1994; Johansen and Zhu, 2013; Nutt 
and Backhoff, 1993; Walker and Bozeman, 2011). To capture the multi-dimensional 
nature of  publicness we focus on the three dimensions identified by Andrews et al. (2011) 
in their review of  academic studies of  publicness and organizational performance: own-
ership, funding and control. In doing so, we present the first study to bring together the 
dimensions of  market authority and political authority in a single study to examine the 
influence on organizations’ adoption, and performance effects, of  management prac-
tices. Further, we align with Bozeman’s (2013) call to employ publicness as a concept 
that can promote cross-fertilization between organization and management with public 
policy, because at its core the concept of  publicness deals with elemental phenomena, 
related to the question ‘what is public?’.
Second, we allow for the complex interdependencies that may exist between the di-
mensions of  market authority and political authority, in shaping organizations’ adoption, 
and performance implications, of  ‘good’ management practices. Economic research has 
provided robust evidence for the productivity benefits of  so-called good management 
practices, such as target setting, incentives and monitoring (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenan, 
2007, Bloom and Van Reenan, 2010). Similarly, three decades of  work in the field of  
management indicates that better people management practices (e.g., ‘high performance 
management’) tend to lead to better financial and market performance in firms of  all 
sizes and sectors (e.g, Combs et al., 2006; Hayton, 2003; Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 
1997). However, contextual and environmental factors are expected to influence both the 
adoption, and the effects, of  good management practices (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007; Hayton, 2003; Jackson and Schuler, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1997; Jackson et al., 
2014; Patel and Cardon, 2010). By employing a configurational approach, in this paper 
we are able to examine whether or not the performance effects of  management practices 
are conditional on the degree of  market authority and political authority. In doing so, we 
extend current literature on high performance work systems that has only examined the 
effect of  a limited set of  contextual factors on practices, and which has been limited in its 
potential by employing a contingency rather than a configurational approach (Jackson et 
al., 2014; Meuer, 2017).
Third, hybrid contexts require organizations to pursue a blend of  both social and eco-
nomic outcomes. To date, studies of  the effects of  management practices upon the deliv-
ery of  public services have produced equivocal results (Boyne, 2003), which may in part 
stem from the difficulty in measuring performance in this context (Boyne, 2003; Boyne 
and Walker, 2004; Boyne et al., 2005). We follow Andrews et al. (2010) and use a multi-di-
mensional measure of  performance, encompassing social and economic outcomes, and 
both objective and subjective data. The data are drawn from inspection reports for each 
organization, which provide politicians, managers and the public information about 
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organizational success or failure in the delivery of  public services (Audit Commission, 
2001, 2002). Our study extends consideration of  contextual hybridity beyond narrow 
structural governance, to dimensional publicness, and at the same time sees such hybrid-
ity as a multi-level interaction with organizational hybridity.
The remainder of  our paper unfolds as follows. We begin by exploring the concept 
of  publicness, delineating the dimensions of  political authority and market authority, 
and explain the logic of  configuration analysis and how it enables us to explore the rela-
tionship between hybrid context, management practices and performance. Second, we 
outline our empirical context, which is the market for old people’s and children’s care 
homes in the UK. We then outline the nature of  our data collection, method and process 
of  analysis. Third, we present and discuss the configuration analysis, which explores the 
relationship between hybrid context, management practices and performance. In our 
penultimate section we highlight our contribution to extant literature and suggest impli-
cations for policymakers, before drawing our conclusions.
HYBRID CONTEXT, MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND PERFORMANCE
As outlined above, governments around the world have sought to blur the distinction be-
tween private, public and not-for-profit sector organizations, creating hybrid contexts as 
a means of  addressing pressing social issues and encouraging the introduction of  private 
sector practices to improve organizational performance in the delivery of  traditionally 
public services (Brandsen and Karre, 2011; Brandsen et al., 2005; Skelcher, 2005; Smith, 
2010). Below, we outline how contextual hybridity can be conceptualized in terms of  the 
mix dimensions of  market authority (competition) and political authority (ownership, 
funding and control), which can have direction and scale.
All organizations are subject to market authority to a greater or lesser extent. Private 
and not-for-profit organizations compete in markets (Desai and Snavely, 2012; Guo, 
2006; Salamon and Elliott, 2002), and public organizations are increasingly being re-
quired to compete with private and not-for-profit organizations (Rashman et al., 2009). 
In some cases what appear to be public sector organizations may be subject to even 
greater market authority than commercial organizations (Bozeman, 2013). Market au-
thority, defined in terms of  the level of  competition in a market (Nutt, 2005), is assumed 
to bring higher efficiency, consumer responsiveness, and effectiveness of  organizations 
operating in the public sphere. Market authority derives from the extent of  competition 
and associated buying behaviour of  clients to whom services are offered (Nutt, 2005).
Similar to market authority, all organizations are subject to political authority, includ-
ing those in the private (Moulton, 2012; Moulton and Feeney, 2010), public (Bozeman 
and Bretschneider, 1994) and not-for-profit (Moulton and Eckerd, 2012) sectors. Political 
authority is not limited to government intervention, it also encompasses intervention 
from other stakeholders (e.g., public pressure groups) as a consequence of  an organi-
zation’s position in society and its pursuit of  public value (Walmsley and Zald, 1973). 
Political authority is manifested in more intensive regulatory environments, increased 
accountability, increased ‘red tape’, more extensive political oversight and greater polit-
ical visibility, not just from government but from other external stakeholders (Bozeman, 
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2013). Directive policy requirements and incentives/disincentives stem from the need to 
provide public value (Johansen and Zhu, 2013).
Drawing on the Andrews et al. (2011) review and synthesis of  the literature on public-
ness, we focus on three dimensions of  political authority: ownership, funding and (polit-
ical) control. Ownership has been the traditional way of  operationalizing the differences 
between public, private and not-for-profit sector organizations. Theoretical debate about 
the importance of  ownership has centred on property rights theory (Clarkson, 1972; 
Demsetz, 1967). The traditional argument is that in the private sector property rights 
align incentives, with shareholders and managers accruing the private benefits of  orga-
nizational performance. In contrast, property rights are more diffuse in publicly owned 
organizations, as individual voters have little incentive to monitor publicly owned orga-
nizations and managers do not have direct financial performance incentives.
Funding focuses on the organization’s source of  revenue. Employing a public choice 
theory of  bureaucracy logic, Niskanen (1971) argues that organizations that obtain their 
revenues from a political sponsor are inherently unresponsive to the people who re-
ceive their services. Andrews et al. (2011) note, however, that public sector reforms have 
strengthened the ability of  government to monitor organizational performance where 
the state is funding the service. Furthermore, governments have sought to increase con-
sumer choice in the delivery of  public services to increase organizations’ responsiveness 
to users.
Finally, political control over organizations means that organizations are subject to the 
priorities set on them by government, which may alter with any change in government 
(or changing of  personnel within government) (Nutt and Backoff, 1993). Rather than 
being judged on more market-based assessments of  performance (e.g., efficiency, effec-
tiveness etc.), performance is measured in terms of  fulfilment of  political expectations.
The creation of  hybrid contexts also means that many government services may now 
be provided by private, public or not-for-profit sector organizations in competition with 
one another (Rashman et al., 2009). Further, governmental attempts to blur private, 
public and not-for-profit sectors has not led to market authority simply replacing political 
authority. Rather, the dimensions of  market and political authority co-exist, sometimes 
complementing and other times conflicting. For example, ownership, funding and con-
trol may be interdependent, and may also exert combined influenced upon the adoption 
of  management practices and performance (Andrews et al., 2011). At times, market and 
political authority may act as incompatible forces that public service providers struggle 
to accommodate simultaneously, hampering organizational performance (Boyne, 2003; 
Currie and Suhomlinova, 2006; Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Entwistle et al., 2007; 
Vancoppenolle, 2011). Thus, the influence of  the contextual dimensions may be less 
certain than universalist models of  management practices suggest. The challenge of  the 
operating in a hybrid context is rendered even greater by the ebbs and flows of  emphasis 
upon political and market authority, which arise from changes in governments and gov-
ernmental agendas (Addicott et al., 2007; Currie and Suhomlinova, 2006; Currie et al., 
2011; Pollitt, 2008; Skelcher, 2000).
Extant studies suggest that managerial practices may vary according to the mix of  po-
litical authority and market authority, and that dimensions of  publicness show a modest 
effect, if  any, on organizational outcomes (Andrews et al., 2011; Heinrich and Fournier 
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2004). The challenge facing scholars is that extant studies have not incorporated all di-
mensions of  market authority and political authority, which may in part be due to the 
studies employing correlational and/or regression-based techniques (including contin-
gency based modelling) that are not able to account for the complex interrelationships 
between multiple dimensions of  publicness, management practices and performance 
simultaneously (Anderson, 2012; Bozeman, 2013). To address the problem of  model-
ling complex relationships we employ a configuration-based approach (see: Fiss, 2007; 
Greckhamer, 2011; Greckhamer et al., 2008; Schneider et al., 2009), which we outline 
in the next section.
Hybrid Context: A Configurational Approach
Based on set-theory, QCA is a useful method for developing theories entailing complex 
causal patterns (Ragin, 1987, 2000, 2008). Many theoretical arguments in management 
research are best stated in terms of  sets and their relations, rather than correlations or 
net effects (Fiss, 2007). In contrast to conventional regression-based modelling, which 
treats variables as competing in explaining variation in outcomes, QCA seeks to show 
how variables combine to create outcomes. Central to the configurational approach are 
the concepts of  conjunction, asymmetry and equifinality. Conjunction emphasizes that 
outcomes rarely have a single cause but rather results from the interdependence of  mul-
tiple conditions (Ragin, 2008). Asymmetry allows for the causes leading to an outcome 
to be different from those leading to the absence of  the outcome (Black and Boal, 1994; 
Miller, 1990; Ragin, 2008). Equifinality refers to a situation where a system can reach 
the same final state from different initial conditions and by a variety of  different paths 
(Katz and Kahn, 1978). Furthermore, both causal asymmetry and equifinality may be 
interrelated in that equifinality may change depending on outcome levels; as one moves 
across outcome levels, different sets of  equally effective configurations may arise (Doty 
et al., 1993; Gresov and Drazin, 1997; Payne, 2006).
The QCA approach enables us to identify commonalities in the form of  configura-
tions between theoretically relevant attributes and outcomes of  interest (Ragin, 2008). 
Our interest centres on the set of  relations between management practices and the di-
mensions of  publicness, and using QCA we seek to identify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that are associated with our outcome of  interest, performance (Ragin, 2000). 
Causal conditions are necessary when the outcome cannot occur without them; whereas 
causal conditions are sufficient when the outcome occurs with the condition present 
(Ragin, 1987).
The advantage of  employing the configurational approach is that it facilitates the ex-
ploration of  complex models, however, complex configurational models are difficult to 
specify a priori. Hence, the configurational approach is well suited to inductive inquiry, 
in which theory is used first to identify a set of  factors to study, and then QCA is used to 
reveal the empirical configurations of  those factors, an approach we follow in this study. 
Accordingly, we employ the output from the configurational modelling to develop new 
insight into the conditions associated with the outcome, and how they may be necessary 
or sufficient for an outcome, based on an organization’s hybrid context and management 
practices.
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DATA AND METHOD
Our empirical focus is old people’s and children’s care homes in the UK. Care homes 
predominantly provide residential care for older people and children who cannot live 
with their own family. The two areas of  activity constitute clearly demarcated and regu-
lated organizational fields, are populated by multiple for-profit, public and not-for-profit 
organizations, and constitute the two largest sectors in residential social care in the UK 
(Gamble, 2008). We collected detailed information on management practices from 204 
care homes in England; details of  which are presented in Table I.
As our method of  analysis does not involve statistical inference or rely on probability 
theory (Greckhamer et al., 2013; Ragin, 2008; Verkuilen, 2005), rather than obtaining 
a nationally representative sample, we focused on generating a sample that had suffi-
cient diversity in relation to the ownership form. We randomly selected children’s care 
homes across regions, and proportionally by local authority, to ensure that our sample 
was representative of  the national population. The resulting sample was relatively evenly 
distributed across the public, for-profit and not-for-profit sectors. For old people’s care 
homes our approach differed as more than 90 per cent of  care homes are in the for-profit 
sector. To ensure that we generated a sample that had sufficient diversity in relation to 
the ownership form, we over-sampled not-for-profit and public sector old people’s care. 
Our final sample consists of  103 children’s care homes and 101 old people’s care homes.
Our data collection strategy employed both interviews and the collection of  archival 
data to address the problem of  common methods bias. The interviews were undertaken 
with the managers of  the care homes to develop our measurement of  management prac-
tices and the three components of  political authority (ownership, funding and control). 
Details of  the interviews are provided below with description of  our measures. In addi-
tion, archival analysis was employed to generate our market authority (competition) and 
performance measures. We describe all variables, measures, and data sources, in the next 
section.
Measures
Performance. Our measure of  performance was gathered from inspection reports provided 
by regulators, which is a common practice in studies of  health and social care (Andrews 
Table I. Proportion of  children’s and old people’s care homes: Ownership type by population and sample
UK children’s care homes (members of  BAAF) UK old people’s care homes (from the CQC)
% Population % Sample % Population % Sample
Public 33.9 31.0 0.9 4.0
Not for-profit 26.6 24.3 6.7 37.0
For-profit 39.5 44.7 92.4 59.0
N 413 103 2,363 101
Notes: While the BAAF is a trade body, it claims to represent more than 90 per cent of  all agencies in the industry. In addi-
tion, we have confirmed that there is no systematic sampling bias in terms of  performance outcomes and other population 
characteristics, such as number of  care home beds.
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et al., 2010). Both types of  care homes are regularly inspected and given a rating by an 
independent regulator: the Care Quality Commission (CQC) for old people’s case of  
care homes; and the Office for Standards in Education (OfSTED) for children’s care 
homes. The inspections generate a composite indicator, which is an aggregation of  
underlying performance indicators into a single measure. While conducted by different 
inspection authorities, both OfSTED (OfSTED, 2009) and CQC (CQC, 2010) employ 
similar methodologies: developing standards; developing indicators and the data to 
measure standards against; assessment of  performance of  providers across a range of  
metrics; and publication and presentation of  ratings publicly. Policy dictates that ratings 
for all providers come from one ‘official’ trusted source, and OfSTED and the CQC have 
a memorandum of  understanding which sets out areas in which they will work together, 
coordinating their roles and activity, in recognition of  their similarity of  approach to 
inspection and reporting.
The index maps across a number of  the different dimensions of  performance identi-
fied by Boyne (2002): whether a provider of  care is safe, effective, caring, responsive to 
peoples’ needs and well led (CQC, 2010). Each organization is rated on every dimension 
by the independent regulator, based upon a mix of  (external) objective performance in-
dicators, external subjective results from the inspection of  services, and service plans and 
standards. The ratings are then converted to an overall performance score (ranging from 
1 [inadequate] to 4 [outstanding]) that is comparable across all organizations.
As a validity check we compared this performance measure with information derived 
from our interviews with care homes managers, in which we asked respondents to rate 
the performance of  their organization on a scale of  1 to 10 (10 indicating high perfor-
mance). Following Andrews et al. (2010), we analysed bivariate correlations between our 
measures of  internal and external performance. The magnitude of  the correlation be-
tween our measure and the internal subjective rating (Spearman’s rank coefficient = 0.6) 
provides evidence for the validity of  this measure of  performance.
Management practices. To measure management practices we employed the method 
developed by Bloom and Van Reenan (2007, 2011; Bloom et al., 2017) in their global 
project to assess the effectiveness of  management practices across countries and sectors. 
The tool provides a comprehensive and robust measure of  the four practices, and has 
been applied and validated across a wide range of  sectors (including hospitals, retailing 
and manufacturing) and countries (including Europe, North American and Asia). The 
method involves two interviewers administering a survey instrument, which includes 
18 indicators of  management practices, grouped into four subcategories: process 
management, monitoring, targets and human resource management (see appendix for 
details). Scoring is based upon a set of  open-ended questions designed to allow a trained 
interviewer to make a reasonable assessment of  the quality of  management practices 
in the organization (e.g., ‘can you tell me how you promote your employees?’). For each 
indicator the interviewer scores between 1 and 5, with a higher score indicating a better 
performance. To ensure that the concept-measure consistency of  the indices was high 
we paid particular attention to this, drawing upon our substantive knowledge of  the 
Bloom and Van Reenan indices. The indices themselves are fine-grained and well-
established measures of  good management practices, which are qualitatively derived and 
 Hybrid Context, Management Practices and Organizational Performance 9
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management 
Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
quantitatively scored. While the indices are numeric, they are calibrated in terms of  sets, 
and so lend themselves to being assessed as necessary and sufficient conditions, not as 
linear scales where all variation is treated as being equally meaningful.
All interviews were carried out in spring 2010, with training on the use of  the survey 
provided by the manager from the original Bloom and colleagues’ management sur-
vey team. Obtaining interviews with managers followed full ethics approval and was 
facilitated by a supporting letter from the CQC and in the name of  the University. All 
interviews were independently double-scored by two interviewers: one conducting the 
interview, the other listening. Any differences in scores were discussed and reconciled 
at the end of  the interview. Each interview lasted 45–60 minutes. All interviews were 
conducted by telephone and the scoring was not discussed with the respondents. The 
interviewers were not aware of  the organization’s performance (or sector) in advance of  
the interview, so their scoring was not influenced by a priori perceptions of  the quality of  
the organization.
For robustness purposes all 18 indicators were subjected to a principle components 
analysis. The analysis indicated that there are four distinct factors (as outlined above: 
operations, monitoring, targets and incentives). We then calculated an overall score for 
each of  the four management practices by taking the average for the scores for each of  
the separate practice indicators. We then calculated the Cronbach’s alpha for each of  the 
four management practices, which all indicated a high degree of  internal reliability, as 
follows: operations (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71), monitoring (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74), targets 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79) and incentives (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70).
Ownership. Consistent with Amirkhanyan et al. (2008), we included an ownership-
based dimension in our measure of  political authority, allowing for three categories 
of  ownership: private, public and not-for-profit. Respondents were asked during the 
interview to indicate which category that best represented their organization’s ownership 
type.
Funding. We defined funding in terms of  the extent that the organization is subject to 
political interference through non-market funding (Nutt and Backoff, 1993). Respondents 
were asked during the interview to provide the percentage of  their organization’s total 
revenue that was derived from government or local government sources (see: Crow and 
Bozeman 1987; Emmert and Crow, 1988).
Control. There are no direct measures of  the degree to which an organization is subject 
to political control by the government (Anderson, 2012). Indirect measures of  political 
control include the influence over the organization’s goals and agendas and/or the degree 
of  influence over its delivery of  services (Anderson, 2012). Accordingly, we measured 
control through the extent to which an organization’s client base was deemed to be 
vulnerable, being drawn from at-risk or disadvantaged groups (Moulton and Feeney, 
2010). The logic being that the provision of  services for vulnerable groups receives a high 
degree of  government attention (and hence control), as compared to non-vulnerable 
groups. All organizations were asked to estimate the proportion of  their client base that 
were deemed ‘vulnerable’, based on the following definitions. For children and young 
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people, we defined vulnerable in terms of  whether or not they come from settings where 
alcohol and drug abuse, or mental health problems of  carers are evident. For old people, 
we defined vulnerability if  their background was one of  poverty, frailty or cognitive 
impairment including conditions such as dementia and Alzheimer’s disease.
Competition. The markets for care homes are geographically fragmented, and so we 
employ a spatial definition of  competition (see: Cooper et al., 2011; Propper et al., 2004; 
Propper et al., 2008). Specifically, we used the fixed radius linear distance approach, 
which defines markets as circular areas centred on the organization’s geographic location. 
Employing publicly available data from OFSTED and the CQC we measured the level of  
competition in each market as number of  competitors within a pre-determined distance, 
which we set at 30km radius (Cooper et al., 2011).
Organizational attributes. We included the size and age of  the organization as additional 
variables (Glisson and Martin, 1980). Unlike econometric regression-based modelling, 
where additional variables are added to a model as controls to remove their effects 
from the analysis, there is no such thing as a control variable in QCA. Employing a 
configurational logic, conditions are included if, and only if, they are considered to be 
among the paramount causes of  the outcome. Hence, QCA requires researchers to 
balance the need to include conditions that are deemed to be important with additional 
conditions increasing the complexity of  the causal explanations, which may lead to a 
smaller share of  configuration that will be observed (Schulze-Bentrop, 2013). Both size 
and age are well-established as conditions that may shape organizational performance 
and in combination with other conditions (Meier and O’Toole, 2002). For example, extant 
research suggests ownership type and size, in combination, may influence performance 
(see: Gage et al., 2009; Lemke and Moos, 1989; Zinn et al., 1992). Data on firm size and 
age were obtained from the CQC, Ofsted and the organizations’ webpages.
Calibrating the Measures into Fuzzy Sets
Rather than dealing with ideal types, which commonly describe ‘only the extremes’ 
(Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006; Verkuilen, 2005), we employ fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets re-
quire the transformation of  the measures into sets that are then calibrated regarding 
full membership, full non-membership and the crossover point (or point of  maximum 
ambiguity) in the set of  interest. Following Ragin (2008), we calibrate our measures using 
a combination of  the indirect for categorical measures and the direct method continuous 
measures. For the indirect method, while the number of  categories for the calibration is 
not limited, we choose four in that they appeared to be the sufficient distinction in vari-
able (e.g., performance). The choice to calibrate the measure along four categories was 
based on examining the data and bringing to bear our knowledge of  the measures and 
the context of  the inspection authorities. For the direct method we define full member-
ship as 1, non-membership as 0, and the crossover point of  0.5 (i.e., where we cannot tell 
whether the case is more in or out of  the set). The crossover point is the point is qualita-
tively assessed and anchored as the mid-point between full and non-membership of  the 
set. Our calculation of  the crossover points is detailed below, and is designed to reflect 
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meaningful thresholds, which is a significant advantage over the conventional use of  in-
dices in regression analysis that tend to be centred on sample means (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 
2008). Full details of  the means and standard deviations of  our measures and details of  
the transformed measures are given in Table II.
Our performance measure employs a scale (1 = inadequate; 2 = adequate; 3 = good; 
4 = outstanding), which we calibrated using the indirect method. Accordingly, we use a 
four-value fuzzy set, but note that the indirect method is not necessarily limited to four 
categories (Ragin, 2008). In calibrating the measure, we were aware of  the lack of  spread 
Table II. Means, standard deviations, and calibration of  measures into fuzzy sets
Measures Mean (Std.dev.) Calibration into fuzzy sets
Performance 2.3 (0.7) We calibrated outstanding performance (4) is fully in and given the 
value of  1; poor performance (1) is fully out given the value of  0; 
good performance (3) is the point that is more in than out and given 
the value of  0.67; and adequate performance (2) is the point that is 
more out than and given the value of  0.33
Operations 3.4 (0.5) We calibrated fully in (good management) above the 90th percentile; 
fully out (poor management) below the 10th percentile; and the 
crossover point 3 on this measure
Monitoring 3.2 (0.5) We calibrated fully in (good management) above the 90th percentile; 
fully out (poor management) below the 10th percentile; and the 
crossover point being 3 on this measure
Target 3.0 (0.5) We calibrated fully in (good management) above the 90th percentile; 
fully out (poor management) below the 10th percentile; and the 
crossover point being 3 on this measure
Incentives 3.1 (0.4) We calibrated fully in (good management) above the 90th percentile; 
fully out (poor management) below the 10th percentile; and the 
crossover point being 3 on this measure
Ownership 1.7 (1.0) We calibrated public sector firms as fully in; private sector firms as fully 
out; and NFP firms as the crossover point
Funding 48.8 (51.2) We calibrated 90% or more funding from government as the fully in; 
below 10% as the fully out; and the crossover point being 50%
Control 34.2 (47.2) We calibrated 65% or more vulnerable clients as the fully in; below 
34% as the fully out; and 50% as the crossover point because this 
marks the difference between those who provided full care for vulner-
able clients and those who did not
Competition 60.1 (70.2) We calibrated agencies with 250 firms or more in 20 Km radius as fully 
in; agencies with less than 10 firms in a 20 Km radius as fully out; 
and agencies with 50 firms in a 20 Km radius is set as the crossover 
point
Size 22.1 (25.3) We calibrated the above the 90th percentile as fully in; below the 10th 
percentile as fully out; and the crossover point as the 50th percentile
Age 25.5 (24.9) We calibrated the above the 90th percentile as fully in; below the 10th 
percentile as fully out; and the crossover point as the 50th percentile
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in the regulatory ratings with nearly 60 per cent of  the population are rated as good. To 
address the issue, we drew on our substantive knowledge of  the measure, and the lin-
guistic forms of  the variable lend themselves to a direct translation into fuzzy sets. The 
indirect method then proceeded by allocating cases to groups according to their degree 
of  membership of  the set; i.e., fully in, mostly in, mostly out, fully out (Ragin, 2000). 
The different degrees of  membership scores are given fuzzy scores; defining outstanding 
performance (4) as fully in (set to the value of  1), poor performance (1) as fully out (set to 
the value of  0), good performance (3) as a point that is more in than out (set to the value 
of  0.67) and adequate performance (2) as a point that is more out than in (set to the value 
of  0.33).
For the continuous measure of  management practices, we employed the direct 
method of  calibration. We set these thresholds based on extant theory and substan-
tive knowledge and utilized the direct method of  calibration in the fsQCA software 
to transform the measures into set memberships (e.g., Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008). The 
work of  Bloom and Van Reenan indicates that management practices do vary across 
firms, tending towards a normal distribution, with a significant tail of  very badly man-
aged organizations (Bloom et al., 2014). Our distribution of  management scores was 
consistent with work of  Bloom and Van Reenan and colleagues. Hence, we followed 
the lead of  Ragin (2008) in suggesting the use of  90 per cent and 10 per cent cut-off  
points for those with the best and worst management practices. The ‘fully in’ (good 
management) were identified as the 90th percentile high scoring firms and the ‘fully out’ 
(poor management) as the 10th percentile of  low scoring firms. To identify the crossover 
point, the maximum point of  indecision, we followed Ragin (2008) in looking closely 
at respondents use of  language, to identify evidence of  indifference in the responses 
corresponding to the rating at the halfway mark (the score 3). As the crossover point 
represents neither good nor poor management of  firms. We felt confident in the choice 
of  crossover point, given the distribution (note: that the crossover is close to the means 
in the distribution of  scores for each practice, but as outlined above this was not our 
motivation for choosing it).
We calibrated the dimensions of  political authority as follows. First, as ownership is 
a categorical variable, we employed the indirect method. As over half  our participat-
ing organizations were private, we calibrated for public sector organizations as fully 
in, and private sector firm as fully out. As not-for-profit firms are deemed to be more 
private than public (Amirkhanyan et al., 2008; Heinrich and Fournier, 2004), we set 
the crossover value as 0.33 (as a robustness check we also ran our analysis employing 
not-for-profits as a crossover point of  0.5, as a fuzzy measure, which produced the same 
results). Second, funding was calibrated via the direct method using the percentages 
with 90 per cent or more funding from government as the fully in, below 10 per cent 
as the fully out, and 50 per cent as the crossover point because this marks the point of  
indifference. Finally, control was calibrated via the direct method using the percentages 
with 65 per cent or more vulnerable clients as the fully in anchor (1), below 34 per 
cent as the fully out anchor (0) and 50 per cent as the crossover point (0.5) because this 
marks the difference between those who provided full care for vulnerable clients and 
those who did not.
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For market authority, we calibrated competition via the direct method. Organizations 
with 250 or more competitors in 30 km radius were classified as fully in, with less than 
10 competitors in a 30 km radius as fully out, and with 50 competitors in a 30 km radius 
is set as the crossover. To convert our variables, calibrated using the direct method, into 
fuzzy sets we translated the set scores into the metric of  log odds using the fQCA soft-
ware program.
Data Analysis
After calibrating our measures, our analysis progressed as follows, using fsQCA software. 
The first step was to examine the causal conditions that are sufficient for the outcome to 
occur constructing a data matrix (or truth table) with 2k rows, where k is the number of  
causal conditions used in the analysis. Each row of  the matrix is associated with a specific 
combination of  attributes, as well as the number of  cases high on these conditions (i.e., 
with fuzzy set membership scores greater 0.5). We then refined our analysis based on the 
criteria of  frequency and consistency (Ragin, 2008).
We applied a frequency cut-off  to ensure that the assessment of  the fuzzy set relations 
occurs only for those configurations considered substantial enough; i.e., exceeding a spe-
cific minimum number of  cases, which we set at three (see: Greckhamer et al., 2013). 
We felt comfortable with our choice considering the relatively large number of  cases in 
our sample. Using our frequency cut-off, we were able to perform further analyses on 
85 per cent of  cases. With our cut-off  set at three, we then analysed the configurations 
with three or more cases for consistency, which we estimated using the consistency coef-
ficient for each configuration for a given outcome. The consistency coefficient is defined 
in terms of  the proportion of  cases consistent with the outcome, which is calculated by 
dividing the number of  cases that exhibit the same configuration of  attributes and the 
outcome from the number of  cases that exhibit the same combination but do not show 
the outcome (see: Ragin, 2008). The resulting number is analogous to a fuzzy conditional 
probability, with numbers closer to 1 signifying a higher likelihood that a configuration 
leads to the outcome (Verkuilen, 2005). Following Ragin (2006, 2008) a value of  0.80 
is considered sufficient to indicate that a given configuration of  causal conditions is re-
liably associated with the outcome of  interest. In addition, we followed Ragin (2006) 
in examining the proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) measure, alongside the 
raw consistency measures. As suggested by Ragin (2006, 2008) the cut-off  value for PRI 
should not be less than 0.75 and higher value is recommended. Accordingly, we looked at 
the truth table and identified a natural break around 0.79. Using this value, we assigned 
a positive outcome (a score of  1) to all the configurations with a score of  greater than or 
equal to 0.79 and set the other configurations in the table to zero.
The second step was to examine the complex causal relationships based on fuzzy sets, 
employing the Quine–McCluskey algorithm to logically reduce or minimize the matrix 
rows to simplified combinations (see: Ragin, 2008). Each of  the final reduced solutions 
was then evaluated with respect to its coverage of  the outcome. We performed the anal-
ysis using the Quine–McCluskey algorithm in fsQCA software, where we specified a 
priori the minimum threshold of  the consistency score and our cut-off  of  frequency of  
cases per configuration as outlined above. The third step was to evaluate and interpret 
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the results generated in step two. As our approach is inductive, we present the complex 
solution, which is the minimal solution derived without the aid of  any logical remainders 
(i.e., we exclude possible configurations not actually observed) (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009).
We chose to present the configurations of  the complex solution, following Ragin 
(2008), in assuming that the logical remainders are not sufficient for the outcome; i.e., 
we exclude logically possible combinations that we do not observe (Ragin, 2008; Rihoux 
and Ragin, 2009). Given that we have a large sample size, the error of  removing logical 
remainders (less than 10 per cent of  the sample) is very much reduced, and we have no 
clear theoretical reason to include the sample logical remainders (Cooper and Glaesser, 
2011).
The complex solution provided us with a good number of  configurations. We then 
assessed the empirical importance of  each configuration using a measure of  coverage, 
which is are indicators of  the percentage of  cases that follow a given pathway to the 
outcome (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008), and if  multiple combinations are sufficient for an out-
come. Raw coverage indicates the relative importance of  the configurations, and unique 
coverage indicates which cases are only explained by this solution (Ragin, 2008). We note 
that the coverage statistics are similar the R-squared in regression (Fiss, 2007).
Following the protocol for large-N QCA studies, in the absence of  detailed case infor-
mation, we examined the robustness of  results to the choices made for the calibration of  
the management measures (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012), the frequency thresholds 
and consistency levels (Ragin, 2008). For our calibrations we checked several crossover 
points for the management practice score (2.5, 3 and 3.5), and found that that changes 
in the crossover points had only a marginal influence on the solutions. Most of  the prime 
configurations were either identical or very similar to the baseline result. For the fre-
quency threshold, as stated earlier, we set the cut-off  at three cases due the size of  our 
sample. As a robustness test we also set the frequency thresholds at two and four cases. 
The results were very stable, but relaxing the thresholds to two did lead to a small increase 
in the number of  solutions generated, but the solutions were all logically substitutable. 
Finally, for consistency levels, we varied the consistency level whilst holding everything 
else constant. Unsurprisingly, changing the threshold to a more demanding level (0.85) 
led to a small decrease in the number of  configurations, and a less demanding level (0.72) 
to a small increase in the configurations. Across all of  the robustness checks, we conclude 
that our analysis is robust as found no meaningful deviation from our presented results.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Our analytical strategy involved assessing causality as a complex set of  interrelationships 
between management practices, political authority, market authority and performance. 
To do so we need to distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions (Fiss, 2007). 
We began by checking for necessary conditions, which appear in all combinations lead-
ing to an outcome (Ragin, 2000). To analyse necessity, we use a consistency score (the 
range being from 0 to 1), which takes a value of  1 when a causal condition is always 
required for the outcome to occur. As a score of  1 is rare, we follow convention to only 
consider conditions with a consistency value above 0.9 (Greckhamer, 2011; Ragin, 2006). 
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We found that all conditions fell below the 0.9 cut-off, and so we have no necessary con-
ditions, confirming that all conditions should be included in the sufficiency analysis. We 
also conducted a robustness check by testing all the conditions in their original, negated 
and re-calibrated form in relation to the outcome. In comparing the results of  the test, 
changing the calibration anchors had no effect on the conclusions drawn for necessary 
conditions.
We now report the results of  the sufficiency analysis and the fuzzy set analysis in rela-
tion to high and low performance. We look at both high and low performance outcomes 
because, unlike regression analysis, fsQCA enables us to explore asymmetry, i.e., whether 
the set of  causal conditions associated with the presence of  high performance is different 
from the set of  conditions associated with the presence of  poor performance. Tables III 
and IV present the configurations and their statistics that are sufficient for the outcomes 
of  high performance and low performance respectively, employing the notation of  Ragin 
and Fiss (2008). At the bottom of  the Tables III and IV the overall consistencies and 
Table III. Analysis of  sufficiency for the causes of  high performance (frequency cut-off  = 3 or more, 
consistency cut-off  = 0.82)
Taxonomic hybrid group Weak Hybrid Context
Market Hybrid 
Context
Political Hybrid 
Context
Strong Hybrid 
Context
Configuration 1a 1b 1c 1d 2a 3a 3b 4a
Political authority: 
Ownership
⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ■ ⃠ ⃠
Political authority: 
Funding
⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ■ ■ ■
Political authority: 
Control
⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ■
Market authority: 
Competition
⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ■ ⃠ ⃠ ■
Operations ⃠ ■ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ■ ■ ■
Monitoring ■ ⃠ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Targets ⃠ ■ ■ ■ ⃠ ⃠ ■
Incentives ⃠ ⃠ ■ ■ ■ ⃠ ■ ■
Size ⃠ ■ ■ ■ ⃠ ■
Age ■ ■ ⃠ ■ ■ ■ ■
Consistency 0.82 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.82 0.96 0.91 0.81
Raw coverage 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.10
Unique coverage 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
Overall solution 
consistency
0.83
Overall solution 
coverage
0.62
Note: ■ high condition; ⃠ low condition; blank cell is non-binding condition.
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coverages scores are presented for the configurations as a whole, as well as raw coverage 
and unique coverage for each configuration. Overall, our tables show high overall con-
sistency scores, indicating that the sufficient conditions are met, and the causal relations 
hold for each solution. Also, the overall solution coverage scores in each of  the tables are 
good, being greater than 0.5 (Ragin, 2008).
We now seek to understand how the different configurations of  management practices, 
political authority, and market authority, may lead to either high performance or low 
performance. Starting with Table III, to reduce or minimize the number of  configura-
tions of  conditions leading to high performance (as outlined above) we set the frequency 
cut-off  to configurations with 3 or more cases, and the consistency cut-off  to 0.80, using 
the Quine–McCluskey algorithm. The overall solution reveals a total of  nine configu-
rations associated with high performance, with an overall consistency measure of  0.83, 
which indicates that all nine configurations should be treated as equally important as 
each provides a sufficient solution to achieve high performance. In Table IV, we set the 
frequency cut-off  to configurations with 3 or more cases and the consistency cut-off  to 
0.80, using the Quine–McCluskey algorithm to minimize the number of  configurations 
of  conditions leading to poor performance. Here, we found seven configurations that led 
to low performance with an overall consistency of  0.75.
To explore the profiles of  our configurations we grouped them on a taxonomic basis, 
based on four distinct groups of  hybrid context, as defined by the mix of  political authority 
Table IV. Analysis of  sufficiency for the causes of  poor performance (frequency cut-off  = 3 or more, 
consistency cut-off  = 0.80)
Taxonomic hybrid group
Weak Hybrid 
Context
Market Hybrid 
Context Political Hybrid Context
Strong Hybrid 
Context
Configuration 1e 2b 3c 3d 3e 4b
Political authority: Ownership ⃠ ⃠ ■ ■ ■ ■
Political authority: Funding ■ ■ ■ ⃠
Political authority: Control
Market authority: Competition ■ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ■
Operations ■ ⃠ ■ ⃠ ⃠
Monitoring ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ■ ⃠
Targets ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠
Incentives ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠
Size ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠ ⃠
Age ⃠ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Consistency 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.74
Raw Coverage 0.31 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.13
Unique coverage 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Overall solution consistency 0.75
Overall solution coverage 0.56
Note: ■ high condition; ⃠ low condition; blank cell is non-binding condition.
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and market authority. ‘Weak hybrid context’ is defined by low political authority (across 
all three components) and low market authority; ‘market hybrid context’ is defined by 
high market authority and low political authority (across all three components); ‘political 
hybrid context’ is defined by high political authority (in one or more component) and 
low market authority; and ‘strong hybrid context’ is defined by high political authority 
(in one or more component) and high market authority. We employed the taxonomy as 
our initial baseline interpretation, from which we unpack and explore the findings below.
High Performance Configurations
From Table III (high performance), it is clear that all solutions for high performance 
require a high condition for either monitoring or target-setting. The weak hybrid context 
grouping had the highest number of  solutions (1a-1d), which reflects the fact there are 
multiple ways in which a firm can perform well with fewer contextual imperatives. All 
weak hybrid context configurations for high performance involve a low condition for 
ownership (i.e., no public sector [1a, 1b and 1d] or are independent of  ownership [1b]), 
with funding and control a low condition for all four solutions, with market authority 
absent for 1a but low for 1b-1d. Across all four configurations we found that at least one 
form of  management practices is highly present; the findings suggesting that in a weak 
context, either monitoring or targets can condition for high performance, and may be 
substitutes for one another in conditioning high performance.
All configurations had a low condition for ownership (apart from 1b, where ownership 
was non-binding), with most of  the organizations being private sector. Taking each con-
figuration in turn, configuration 1a requires the high presence of  monitoring to condi-
tion high performance (raw coverage 0.18) and is associated with the complete absence 
of  market authority and low condition for the three dimensions of  political authority. 
The cases associated with this configuration are predominantly private sector organiza-
tions. Configuration 1b shows a causal condition involving the low presence of  political 
and market authority and the high presence of  operations and target-based practices 
that lead to high performance. We note that operations is only present as a high condi-
tion in this configuration and is a configuration in which the majority of  organizations’ 
ownership type is defined by public ownership. Further, 1c and 1d show that incentives 
can work in tandem with either monitoring or target-based practices. Here both moni-
toring and targets seem to be substitutes, when we have low political authority and low 
market authority. Overall, we note that for weak hybrid context we see a necessary condi-
tion for the presence of  monitoring or targets, suggesting that they may act as a substitute 
for one another.
The second group we termed market hybrid context, as defined by high market au-
thority and low scores across all three dimensions of  political authority. This group had 
only one solution (2a). The sample of  cases in this configuration is drawn mostly from 
firms that are non-public sector organizations, being largely private sector (raw cover-
age = 0.15). The configuration shows that high performance is conditioned by the high 
level of  the three people management practices: monitoring, targets and incentives. 
This suggests that high performing organizations in contexts characterized by market 
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competition without political authority, are those which have adopted a wide range of  
good management practices.
The third group we termed political hybrid context, as defined by high political au-
thority (in one or more component) and low market authority. We found two config-
urations that led to high performance (3a – coverage 0.12; 3b – coverage 0.14). The 
two configurations differ in that 3a comprises mostly public sector organizations and 
3b comprises mostly not-for-profit organizations. Both configurations were conditioned 
by a low condition for competition, and a high condition for funding, but differed in 
that 3a was conditioned by low control and 3b by high control. For both 3a and 3b, 
high performance was conditioned by the presence of  both operations and monitoring, 
which suggests that in the political hybrid context the two practices should be viewed as 
complements. For configuration 3b, we also found high performance to be conditioned 
by incentives. We note that operations appears to be more important in the political 
context, as compared to the weak context and market context, suggesting that operations 
becomes more important when organizations face a higher degree of  political authority.
The final group we termed strong hybrid context, as defined by high political au-
thority (in one or more component) and high market authority. Only one configuration 
was present for high performance (4a), with a coverage of  0.10, and a limited unique 
coverage (0.01). The configuration is the least common, but still important, in the over-
all set of  configurations for high performance. The high binding conditions of  hybrid 
context are funding and market competition, with control a non-binding condition. High 
performance in configuration 4a is conditioned by the presence of  high performance 
across all four management practices. The configuration is comprised of  organizations 
that are largely non-public sector organizations, who face a high and binding condition 
for both political authority (funding) and market authority (competition). We consider 
this group of  organizations to be particularly interesting, from both an empirical and 
theoretical point of  view, as their context is the most difficult in which to operate (Boyne, 
2003; Currie and Suhomlinova, 2006; Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Entwistle et al., 2007; 
Vancoppenolle, 2011). The configuration suggests that a strong hybrid context requires 
firms to more fully develop a range of  management practices, in comparison to weak 
hybrid context, political hybrid context and market hybrid context.
In drawing together our findings for high performance we make the following obser-
vations. In terms of  hybrid context, the most important dimensions in shaping the rela-
tionship between context, management practices and performance appear to be funding 
and competition. Where political authority is high, funding is always a high condition for 
our high performance configurations. In relation to our four taxonomic groups we draw 
then following conclusions. First, for a weak hybrid context, monitoring or target-based 
practices act as substitutes for one another in conditioning high performance. Second, 
for a market hybrid context, organizations are required to develop a greater range of  
management practices to condition high performance, specifically, monitoring, targets or 
incentives-based practices. Third, for a political hybrid contexts, there is a requirement 
for both operations and monitoring based practices to condition for high performance; 
and incentives emerge as important in the presence of  high public control. Finally, for a 
strong hybrid context, organizations are required to have the most extensive repertoire 
of  management best practices to condition for high performance.
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Low Performance Configurations
We now turn to the six configurations associated with low performance (see Table IV). 
The group for the weak hybrid context included only one solution (1e: coverage 0.31), 
with poor performance being conditioned by the low scores on all management practices 
except operations. In comparing the finding for management practices to configurations 
1a-1d, that led to high performance, we highlight the absence of  monitoring or tar-
get-based practices that appear to be important in driving high performance. Further, a 
high condition for operations, in the absence of  high conditions for other management 
practices, does not condition for high performance in a low hybrid context.
The market hybrid context configuration consists of  one solution (2b: raw coverage 
0.17), which is largely drawn from organizations that are non-public sector. The solution 
involves a high condition for competition. The low performance market context config-
uration suggests that poor performance is conditioned by the absence of  well-developed 
management practices. When compared to the configuration that led to high perfor-
mance in a market hybrid context (2a), we suggest that the findings appear to be a near 
mirror image.
In a political hybrid context, we found three configurations associated with poor per-
formance (3c-3e), all of  which are largely drawn from public sector organizations. The 
solutions all involve the high condition of  public funding, and the low condition of  com-
petition. All solutions involve either none (3c) or just one management practice, which 
are operations (3d) and monitoring (3e). When compared to the configurations that con-
dition for high performance in a political hybrid context, which indicates the necessity of  
a high and binding condition for operations and monitoring, it appears that the presence 
of  fewer management best practices is associated with poor performance.
Finally, we only found one configuration (4b) associated with poor performance in 
strong hybrid contexts. Configuration 4b involves both high levels of  competition and 
public ownership being a high condition. In this low performance configuration, all four 
management practices are also low. Again, this finding is the mirror image of  the config-
uration for high performing firms in a strong hybrid context.
In drawing together our findings for low performance we make the following obser-
vations. First, we found configurations that led to poor performance across all hybrid 
contexts, and across all organizational types, as defined by ownership. Second, control 
is not associated with low performance configurations. Third, there is a low prevalence 
of  management best practices across all six configurations leading to low performance. 
Fourth, in all but one configuration, monitoring and target-based practices are found to 
be low.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we have explored the idea of  hybridity as context (see: Skelcher and Smith, 
2015), motivated by governmental reforms that have blurred the traditional boundaries 
between sectors with the aim of  harnessing the best features of  each (Bozeman, 2013; 
Newman, 2001). To operationalize the idea of  contextual hybridity we draw on the 
concept of  dimensional publicness, as defined by the degree to which an organization 
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is subject to political authority and market authority (Bozeman, 1984, 1987, 2013; 
Bozeman and Bretschneider, 1994; Johansen and Zhu, 2013; Nutt and Backhoff, 1993; 
Walker and Bozeman 2011). To examine the complex relationships that exist between 
the different dimensions of  hybrid context, management practices and organizational 
performance, we employed a configurational approach (e.g., Bensaou and Venkatraman, 
1995; Doty and Glick 1993; Ketchen et al., 1993; Ketchen et al., 1997; Meyer et al., 
1993) and method (see: Fiss, 2011).
The key findings from our research are as follows. First, the conditioning effects for 
high and low performance are conjunctural in nature, in that outcomes result from the 
interdependence of  multiple conditions (Ragin, 2008), although configurations are dif-
ferent across the four taxonomic groups. Second, these configurations demonstrate equi-
finality, in that there is significant variation in terms of  the mix of  management practices 
and hybrid contexts that lead to high performance. Third, there is significant symme-
try between our findings for the configurations that lead to high and low performance, 
with the presence of  good management practices being a necessary condition for high 
performing organizations, while the absence of  these practices was a condition for low 
performing organizations. We expand on each point below.
The conjunctural nature of  our results attest to the importance of  examining the in-
teraction between an organization’s hybrid context and its practices. Our findings show 
that a hybrid contexts have a material impact on an organization’s adoption of  manage-
ment practices, and the coexistence of  both contextual characteristics and the adoption 
of  good management practices impacts on performance. Further, our findings attest to 
the fact that hybrid contexts cannot be reduced to the simple distinction between sec-
tors: there are different sets of  hybridity resulting from different combinations of  the 
dimensions of  political authority and market authority. We observe that there can be 
both weak hybrid context, in which there is a balance of  low public ownership and low 
market competition, as well as strong hybrid context, in which both political authority 
and market authority co-exist. These two forms of  hybridity are associated with quite 
distinct requirements for good management practice in high performing organizations. 
Two forms of  intermediate hybrid context exist in which the market and political author-
ity dimensions are high and low respectively.
We further observe that the organizations operating in a political hybrid context are 
not uniform, and may face different combinations of  the three dimensions of  political 
authority. In turn, these different configurations appear to have implications for which 
combinations of  management practices are associated with high performance. All of  
this offers evidence that a multi-dimensional approach to address the issue of  political 
authority is helpful to better clarify what ‘good management practice’ might look like 
when such blurring of  sectors is acknowledged (Bozeman, 1984, 1987, 2013; Bozeman 
and Bretschneider, 1994; Johansen and Zhu, 2013; Nutt and Backhoff, 1993; Walker and 
Bozeman 2011).
These results extend debate about the performance implications of  the generic transfer 
of  management practices beyond the binary divide, between private and public sectors, 
that has been prevalent to date (Andrews et al., 2011; Boyne, 2002; Boyne and Walker, 
2010). We now might ask two interrelated questions: ‘what management practices?’ and 
‘in what context?’. In doing so we accept management practices are important in the 
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provision of  public services, but take a more nuanced approach to their application in 
what is now a hybrid context for organizations delivering public services.
Our study suggests that we need to get away from a simplified debate that assumes 
a binary condition of  either public sector or private sector in examining management 
practices and performance. Prior work has suggested that good management practices 
are important for productivity or other performance measures in manufacturing, educa-
tion, and healthcare (e.g., Bloom et al., 2014) and indeed much of  the ‘strategic HRM’ 
literature has indicated similarly that ‘more is better’ when it comes to understanding the 
role of  best management practices across the entire economy, public and private (e.g., 
Huselid, 1995; Jackson et al., 2014; Kaufman, 2012). The current evidence extends these 
observations. We do see some evidence of  the ‘more is better’ hypothesis with respect to 
management practices, in that regardless of  the contextual factors, high performing or-
ganizations in this study exhibit systematically more application of  best practice than the 
low performing organizations. The finding appears consistent with prior evidence with 
respect to the importance of  good management for performance (Bloom et al., 2014; 
Combs et al., 2006; Hayton, 2003; Huselid, 1995; Jackson and Schuler, 1995; Jackson et 
al., 2014; Prennushi et al., 1997).
It is commonly assumed that the association between competition and the adoption 
of  management best practices should be positive (Bloom et al., 2014). Kaufman (2012), 
however, argues that since industry concentration results in lower margins the effect of  
competition may also be to erode employer’s willingness to invest in their human re-
sources and associated management practices. Our study provides support for the posi-
tive effects of  market competition upon the use of  good practices, with high performing 
organizations in the market hybrid context and the strong hybrid context exhibiting 
greater emphasis on management practices than those in the weak hybrid context with 
little competition. Our configuration analysis, however, allows us to observe something 
that might be lost in a simple linear model of  the effects of  market competition: that is, 
the absence of  market competition does not lead to simple reduction in management 
practices. We see that even when market competition is low, the presence of  different 
combinations of  the dimensions of  political authority are associated with different de-
grees of  adoption, which are still more extensive than the weak context cases.
In addition to rejecting a simple binary model, these results also lead us to question the 
logic in which the political hybrid context and the market hybrid context are two ends 
of  a simple continuum. The results not only demonstrate the need to consider the null 
case (our ‘weak hybrid context’) where there is little external authority driving adoption 
of  practices; they also suggest that the end of  the continuum is the strong hybrid context 
in which multiple forms of  authority influence adoption of  practices. The most complex 
hybrid environments, rather than the market hybrid or political hybrid contexts, seem to 
rely upon the most extensive adoption of  good practices. Thus, rather than a pure effect 
of  the market conditioning good practice, it is market authority plus political authority, 
which exhibit the greatest adoption. Rather than the market being the end of  the contin-
uum, it is the strong hybrid context which leads the way in the adoption of  management. 
The implication is that in order to fully understand the drivers of  adoption of  good 
management practices in any context, it is important to consider the degree of  political 
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authority as well as market authority that is exerted upon the organization (Bloom et al., 
2014; Simon, 1998).
Taken as a whole, it is clear that there is a positive relationship between the extent of  
good management practices and enhanced organizational performance, but that the na-
ture of  the practices that are required to condition for high performance is linked to the 
hybrid context and not only the degree of  exposure to market conditions. That is, an or-
ganization needs to be able to configure their organization such that their set of  practices 
interrelate with context for political as well as for market authority in a positive manner. 
In a seminal monograph about shaping strategic change, Pettigrew et al. (1992) critiqued 
as simplistic the debate about the generic transfer of  management practices from private 
to public sector, by arguing that management practices matter, and the absence of  per-
formance improvement following their introduction is likely down to their implementa-
tion. Our study reinvigorates this debate to consider, ‘what management practices, and 
where?’ rather than simply ‘are more always better?’.
In returning to our four taxonomic groups we make the following observations. For a 
weak hybrid context, with low political authority and low market authority, organizations 
have the least pressure to adopt better management practices. Yet, in high performing 
organizations we still see the adoption of  a subset of  practices involving one or other of  
the combinations of  monitoring, targets and incentives. Conversely, in poor performing 
firms we see a total absence of  attention to target setting, monitoring, or incentives. We 
face a societal challenge in persistent reports of  poor care in old people’s care homes in 
the UK, which operate in a less regulated domain of  public services, and which may ex-
perience less market competition. Our findings study suggest policymakers should attend 
more closely to management practices in such poorly performing homes (Cooper et al., 
2018). Using policy levers to address contextual factors alone, either increase compe-
tition and/or political authority through one or more of  the dimensions studied here, 
could just as likely result in poor performing organization operating in market hybrid, 
political hybrid or strong hybrid contexts. Policy needs to address the core issue of  man-
agement practices. Further research is needed to understand why organizations fail to 
adopt the most basic of  practices with significant performance consequences. Yet some 
evidence from across the economy suggests that the principle barrier to the adoption of  
good practices is that of  the skills of  managers and leaders (Hayton, 2015).
The market hybrid context is the most similar to traditional markets, as defined by 
competition and the minimal presence of  government. In a market hybrid context we see 
the strong conditioning effect of  market competition leading to the adoption, and perfor-
mance implications, of  good management practices. There are some markets for public 
services that operate very much as private sector markets. Reduced budgets for adult 
social care in local authorities in the UK, alongside other policy forces, has effectively 
privatised old people’s care in residential settings. With an ageing population, this has 
become an expanding and lucrative market in which care home chains have developed, 
bringing with them a more corporate orientation and associated management practices, 
which in turn have had a performance enhancing effect. In essence, it seems the weak 
regulatory regime for older people’s care homes, which we note above contributes to-
wards poor quality care (Cooper et al., 2018), may be countered by marketization, but 
only where appropriate management capabilities exist within and across organizations. 
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The evidence from our study makes the point that within a particular context, improved 
management practices can support improved performance. It is important to be clear, 
however, that the evidence does not suggest that simply changing contexts will automati-
cally improve outcomes. Rather, without attention to management practices, no amount 
of  marketization or political oversight can enhance outcomes.
In a political hybrid context, the autonomy and flexibility of  organizations is more 
limited, being constrained by government mandate and client obligation (Johansen and 
Zhu, 2013). To date, scholars have suggested that organizations ranked high on political 
authority are reluctant to adopt organizational changes (Antonsen and Jorgensen, 1997). 
The low levels of  market authority, in combination with high political authority, enable 
managers to eschew the adoption of  newer management practices. Our finding for po-
litical authority, however, goes beyond prior studies that are unable to accommodate the 
complexities of  multiple components of  political authority (Antonsen and Jorgenson, 
1997; Henrich and Fournier, 2004).
Specifically, we found that in a political hybrid context, organizations need to develop 
specific management practices to condition for high performance, namely operations 
and monitoring practices, which appear to be complements. The absence of  operations 
and monitoring practices appears to condition for low performance. Government policy 
‘steers’, rather than ‘rows’ those organizations delivering public services; that is, it sets the 
ends but not the means of  public services delivery (Hood, 1991). Following which, man-
agement have discretion in the practices they enact towards high performance. Thus, 
despite political authority playing a significant role in conditioning an emphasis upon 
management practices that ensure delivery against government set targets, the contrast 
between the performing and non performing organizations highlights that there is still 
room for managerial discretion. The fact that there remain poor performing organiza-
tions, which are also characterised by a failure to implement operations and monitoring 
practices, indicates the potential for policy makers to impact outcomes through policies 
designed to promote and support better management practice.
The strong hybrid context is one that presents managers with a tension, between the 
demands of  compliance with political authority and the demands of  market authority 
(Boyne, 2003; Currie and Suhomlinova, 2006; Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Entwistle et 
al., 2007; Vancoppenolle, 2011). The strong hybrid context is the most complex studied 
here, with high performance being conditioned by the presence of  all four management 
practices. The dimensional nature of  political authority and market authority presents 
tensions that the organization has to address simultaneously. Hence rather than being 
able to substitute management practices, organizations are required to develop the full 
range of  practices, which may act as complements (Huselid, 1995; Jackson and Schuler, 
1995; Jackson et al., 2014).
Our results suggest that some organizations are able to balance and/or resolve con-
tradictions from political and market authority better than others. The ability to manage 
the contradictions between political and market authority has parallels with the litera-
ture on ambidexterity, which relates to managers’ ability to manage current demands 
whilst being adaptable to the changes in the environment (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Strauss et al., 2015). The low level of  coverage observed for high performing organi-
zations in the strong hybrid context suggests that the ability of  management to resolve 
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contextual ambidexterity that relates to the inherent tensions of  dual authority is rela-
tively scarce (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013). In order for organizations to respond to the 
pressure of  becoming more ambidextrous the capability of  senior management will need 
to be enhanced (Jansen et al., 2009; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). Also, there will also 
a need to develop middle manager capability in this respect, with hybrid managers, who 
have experience and expertise across contexts that exhibit political and market authority, 
well placed to balance and/or resolve any contradictions (Strauss et al., 2015).
Managerial and Policy Implications
The managerial and policy implications of  our work are clear. First, in the face of  on-
going debate about generic transfer of  management practices from private to public 
sector (Andrews et al., 2011; Boyne, 2002; Boyne and Walker, 2010), our study cautions 
organizations against adoption of  a universal set of  best practices. Instead organizations 
need to take account of  their hybrid context, and the different dimensions of  political 
authority and market authority, in their choices about their adoption of  management 
practices in pursuit of  performance improvement (Pettigrew et al., 1992).
Second, from a policy perspective, our study highlights the significance of  understand-
ing the effects of  the components of  political authority and market authority, and how 
they may jointly and individually influence the achievement policy goals (Lindblom, 
2002). We found evidence that the use of  good management practices is associated with 
high performance across all possible configurations of  market and political authority, but 
the groups differ in terms of  the configurations and extent of  these practices. The policy 
implication is that absent support and encouragement for the application of  improved 
management practices in any of  these hybrid settings, the manipulation of  context alone 
(e.g., through ‘marketization’ of  contexts characterized by political authority) will not 
produce satisfactory results. We note further, that the high performing organizations in 
the strong hybrid context grouping were fewer in number (coverage was 1 per cent) than 
the other groups, suggesting that it is rare for organizations to perform well in strong 
hybrid contexts due to the difficulty in balancing the tension between high political au-
thority and high market authority.
Limitations and Future Research
As with all studies, ours has a number of  limitations that merit further discussion, but 
also point to interesting new avenues for future research. First, our analysis relies on 
cross-sectional data, limiting our ability to infer whether and how management practices 
are altered in response to a particular external constraint or change. Given that govern-
ment policy, as well as sectoral competitive forces, may change the emphasis placed upon 
political authority and market authority over time within a given context (Addicott et al., 
2007; Currie and Suhomlinova, 2006; Currie et al., 2011; Pollitt, 2008; Skelcher, 2000), 
we encourage future research to consider the role of  changing contexts in influencing 
management practices and the effect upon performance in longitudinal research designs.
Second, our sample of  organizations is drawn from two sectors with vulnerable cli-
ent group (Burns et al., 2013; Kirkpatrick et al., 2001). Organizations facing potentially 
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conflicting sources of  external authority, however, may operate in sectors that vary from 
refuse collection to public transport. It is important, therefore, to replicate this study 
across a range of  different sectors, with different client groups, to see if  our patterns of  
configurations and our findings generalize to other sectors.
Third, we have drawn upon fsQCA to investigate two outcomes: high performance 
and low performance. One of  the many advantages of  fuzzy set-theoretic analyses is 
that it can accommodate degrees in the focal outcome. Subsequent work should fol-
low Greckhamer’s (2011) example and investigate multiple gradations of  performance, 
which enable the further investigation of  (a)symmetry across possible configurations.
CONCLUSION
Employing dimensional publicness (see: Bozeman, 1984, 1987, 2013; Bozeman and 
Bretschneider, 1994; Johansen and Zhu, 2013; Nutt and Backhoff, 1993; Walker and 
Bozeman, 2011), and a configurational approach, we have explored the relationship be-
tween organizational hybrid context, the adoption of  management practices and perfor-
mance. Our findings indicate that management practices are important in shaping firm 
performance, but that the volume and nature of  the practices required is shaped by the 
nature of  the hybrid context the firm faces. Hence, the assumption that universal man-
agement practices can be transferred successfully from the private sector to other sectors 
only holds under specific configurational conditions. Our study moves the debate about 
management practices from a binary one, based on ownership boundaries of  private and 
public sectors, towards one that recognizes a continuum of  contexts in assessment of  the 
management practices that matter.
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Appendix I. Management practices interview guide (see link: http://world manag ement 
survey.org/surve y-data/)
Categories Score from 1 to 5 based on
Introduction of  operational 
processes
How the motivation and impetus behind changes to operations and what 
change story was communicated and how well the care management 
process is configured?
Rationale for introduction 
of  modern operational 
techniques
What is the main rationale for making operational improvements to 
the care management process or pathway? Can you give me a recent 
example?
Process problem 
documentation
Are process improvements made only when problems arise, or are they 
actively sought out for continuous improvement as part of  normal busi-
ness processes?
Performance tracking Is tracking ad hoc and incomplete, or is performance continually tracked 
and communicated to all staff ?
Performance review Is performance reviewed infrequently and only on a success/failure scale, 
or is performance reviewed continually with an expectation of  continu-
ous improvement?
Performance dialogue In review/performance conversations, to what extent are the purpose, data, 
agenda, and follow-up steps (like coaching) clear to all parties?
Consequence management To what extent does failure to achieve agreed objectives carry conse-
quences, which can include retraining or reassignment to other jobs?
Target balance Are the targets meaningful or is there a balance of  financial and nonfinan-
cial targets?
Target interconnection Are targets are linked to overall objectives and how well they cascade down 
the organisation?
Target time horizon Does the organisation have a rational approach to planning and setting 
targets?
Target stretching Are targets too easy to achieve, especially for some ‘sacred cow’ areas of  
the firm, or are goals demanding but attainable for all parts of  the firm?
Performance clarity Are performance measures ill-defined, poorly understood, and private, or 
are they well-defined, clearly communicated, and made public?
Managing human capital To what extent are senior managers evaluated and held accountable for 
attracting, retaining, and developing talent throughout the organization?
Rewarding high 
performance
To what extent are people in the firm rewarded equally irrespective of  
performance level, or is performance clearly related to accountability 
and rewards?
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Categories Score from 1 to 5 based on
Removing poor performers Are poor performers rarely removed, or are they retrained and/or moved 
into different roles or out of  the organisation as soon as the weakness is 
identified?
Promoting high performers Are people promoted mainly on the basis of  tenure, or does the firm ac-
tively identify, develop, and promote its top performers?
Attracting human capital 
modern
Do competitors offer stronger reasons for talented people to join their 
companies, or does a firm provide a wide range of  reasons to encourage 
talented people to join?
Retaining human capital Does the firm do relatively little to retain top talent, or does it do whatever 
it takes to retain top talent when they look likely to leave?
Appendix I. Continued
